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STAW
TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS
STUMBLING TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
ORGANIZATIONS:
An Autobiographical Look at the Direction of 
Organizational Research
Barry M. Staw
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, 
California 94720; email: staw@berkeley.edu
■ Abstract I recount some of my early experiences in the field and how they shaped my
views about conducting research. As I describe it, my entry into organizational behavior was
not  at  all  seamless,  requiring  a series  of  adjustments  along the way.  Like  many of  my
colleagues who had moved into the field of organizational behavior, I had to find a source of
valued added---a new perspective or set of alternative ideas to contribute to the field. This
process of adjustment, I fear, is no longer so prevalent in the field today. Although  many
social  psychologists have migrated to business schools, they are still  by and large doing
social  psychological  rather  than  organizational  research.  They  often  extend  social
psychological  theories  to  the  business  context,  but  they  rarely  seek  to  reframe  and
reformulate core organizational issues and problems. For this to change, I argue that future
research needs to become more contextual and phenomenon-driven. My hope is that, with
the recent upsurge in talent entering the field, we can find a way to harvest more of its
creativity, moving from the application of social psychology to a genuine social psychology
of organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
As with the Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and 
Organizational Behavior’s first two perspectives articles (Porter & 
Schneider 2014, Schein 2015), I offer some background about our field 
as well as some observations about how it has evolved over the past 
decades. But I do this from a very personal standpoint. That is, I provide 
a brief narrative about how I entered the field and what awaited me as I 
began my academic career. The reason I start with such a personal 
narrative is not because my entry into the field was so special or 
idiosyncratic. It was probably fairly typical at the time for someone 
moving from a background in both social psychological research and 
business into the field of organizational behavior. However, what was 
important about my early experiences and those of many of my 
colleagues was the necessity for us to adapt as we migrated into 
organizational behavior. We entered the field with a set of skills and 
perspectives that required many alterations if we were to succeed in this 
new environment. In addition to our changing, we also worked hard to 
influence the field, with the product being one of mutual adaptation. 
Unfortunately, as I argue here, I do not think this same level of mutual 
adjustment is now occurring in organizational behavior, and as a result 
the field has not advanced as far as it could.
In this article, I mostly address the field of organizational behavior 
rather than industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology, given that was
my port of entry and has been my working environment ever since. I 
focus especially on how the field of organizational behavior has changed 
over the years, mainly due to the increasing number of social 
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psychologists joining the area. The migration of social psychologists to 
organizational behavior has presented certain challenges as well as 
opportunities. Our field has become increasingly microscopic and theory 
driven, with the goal of extending social psychological theory to the 
organizational context rather than understanding the organizational 
context itself. As a result, I describe how we might redirect our efforts 
toward a more contextual and phenomenon-driven agenda. I close by 
offering some tips on studying negative rather than positive outcomes 
and some suggestions for steering the field away from the perspective of
the corporation toward the welfare of the employee and the common 
good. My hope is that, with some substantive changes to our field, we 
can move closer to a social psychology of organizations rather than 
drifting toward an application of disciplinary research.
HOW I ENTERED THE FIELD
Graduate School
My introduction to the field of organizational behavior began during 
graduate school at the University of Michigan. I was enrolled in 
Michigan’s MBA program hoping to someday become a top executive 
with a Fortune 500 company. However, soon after my arrival on campus I
discovered that I enjoyed discussions of social science with friends 
studying political science and anthropology much more than any of my 
course material in accounting and finance. Because of my changing 
interests, I capitalized on Michigan’s flexibility in its MBA curriculum, 
taking several psychology courses as electives. I managed to attend 
classes taught by some famed organizational researchers (e.g., Stanley 
Seashore, Arnold Tannenbaum, Basil Geogeopolis), but I still wasn’t sure 
I wanted to be a real psychologist. Luckily, I found what I believed to be 
the perfect compromise in an emerging field called organizational 
behavior. The only complication was that it was 1968, and the Vietnam 
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War was raging. First, I needed to find a way to avoid being drafted into 
a war I firmly opposed.
Northwestern had circulated a flyer advertising a new program in what 
it called, Organization Theory, boasting an interdisciplinary faculty drawn
from business, engineering, psychology, sociology, political science, and 
anthropology. This sounded perfect. It was an ideal blend for someone 
like me who was unsure of his intellectual and professional leanings. And,
to make matters even better, the founder and coordinator of the 
program, Michael Radnor, assured me that I would be able to get a draft 
deferment if I worked as a research assistant on his NASA grant. So, off 
to Northwestern I went, excited about learning everything I could about 
this budding field of organization theory.
Soon I discovered that prospective students should be a bit more 
skeptical when reading flyers about new academic programs. Most of the
faculty associated with this interdisciplinary program had no plans to 
teach any courses related to organizations, nor take on students 
specializing in the area. In fact, the existing program consisted only of a 
couple of seminars on macro-organizational behavior, held during 
students’ second year. For our first year, we were basically on our own, 
advised to take the graduate core in sociology, psychology, and 
economics. After some initial panic and feelings of abandonment, each of
the new students gravitated to either the psychology or sociology 
department. But we were migrant scholars, and as such we had to 
perform well enough for the disciplinary faculty to pay some attention to 
us.
I was fortunate to work with Tom Cook, Phil Brickman, and Don 
Campbell in Northwestern’s psychology department. My promised draft 
deferment did not pan out, but I managed to avoid the Vietnam War 
through a series of appeals and legal maneuvers. I was especially 
fortunate in being able to combine my concern about the draft with an 
appreciation of field experimentation gleaned from courses with Cook 
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and Campbell. In fact, my first true introduction to social science 
research was a joint project with a fellow student (Bill Notz) that used the
draft lottery as a natural field experiment to predict students’ attitudes 
toward the Vietnam War. Tom Cook helped us publish this research in 
the Journal of Psychology and Social Psychology (Notz et al. 1971), and 
we meticulously studied each of his alterations and additions to begin 
learning the craft of publishing psychological research.
From our training at Northwestern, Bill Notz and I also appreciated how
rare it was to have a naturally randomized treatment---and therefore we 
both wanted to use the draft lottery in our dissertations. But doing so 
would require a “joint dissertation,” something that had never been tried
before, at least at Northwestern. Several faculty members from 
psychology and business advocated for us to be a test case for the idea, 
but, alas, it was turned down by the graduate school. As a result, Bill and
I divided up our proposed studies. He took the education sample and 
looked at the effects of the draft lottery on young men’s decisions to stay
in college (Notz 1977). I used the lottery to test self-justification versus 
self-interest effects on the motivation of ROTC cadets. I wanted to see 
how men who had joined ROTC primarily to avoid being drafted would 
cope with the program once they had received a safe draft number, one 
that invalidated their original reason for joining the organization. In this 
context, self-justification prevailed, with cadets’ attitudes and 
performance showing improvement after receiving high lottery numbers 
(Staw 1974).
Getting a Job
Armed with what I thought was an interesting dissertation, I started 
searching for an academic job. I soon learned that my background and 
interests were not preferred for incoming faculty in organizational 
behavior, and as a consequence, several job interviews were disastrous. 
One campus visit began with a heated argument with a business school 
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dean who thought social science research was something that young 
faculty should avoid. Another interview with a representative of a top 
business school ended with the observation, “Of course we won’t be 
interested in hiring you, but would you like to know what I think of your 
dissertation.” I said, “Sure,” feeling confident in the value of my work. 
His response was, “It’s like pissing in the breeze. That’s what I think of 
your dissertation…an utter waste of time.” From these two interviews 
alone, I might have concluded that organizational behavior was not a 
favorite topic for business school faculty. But it was more than that. The 
major stumbling block was that I was not addressing an important 
problem in a business context, with members of the business community
as my respondents. It didn’t matter that the research had a unique data 
set or capitalized on an unusual event (i.e., the draft lottery). What 
mattered was that I had not attacked a real business problem, nor 
gathered my data from real employees at an actual business 
organization.
Fortunately, there were a few departments interested in hiring me. 
Indiana University was objectively the best option, given that it had a 
seasoned group of organizational behavior faculty (led by Bill Scott) who 
often conducted experimental research. But I opted for the University of 
Illinois’ business school, which was trying to build a new group in 
organizational behavior. A year earlier, Jeff Pfeffer had arrived from 
Stanford Business School with an exciting agenda of sociological 
research on organizations. Jerry Salancik and Bobby Calder were also 
new arrivals. They were both creative social psychologists who had 
crossed over to organizational research from Yale and North Carolina’s 
psychology departments. The next year we added Greg Oldham from 
Yale’s Department of Administrative Science and Lou Pondy who was 
already on the faculty at Duke. This was soon followed by Keith 
Murnighan from Purdue’s social psychology program and Dave Whetten 
from Cornell’s program in industrial relations.
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As strong as this group of faculty now appears in retrospect, it was not 
an easy beginning for most of us. We were not led by a group of 
established scholars, especially on the micro side, and we had little 
contact with the much better known and respected I/O psychology 
program within Illinois’ psychology department. Not surprisingly, during 
my first year at Illinois only Pfeffer was having success at publishing in 
organizational research journals. The rest of us were receiving rejections 
that read more or less like the following: “This might be fine social 
psychological research, but it is not relevant to the fields of 
organizational behavior and I/O psychology.” Journals dismissed our 
arguments that an understanding of organizational behavior required a 
deeper understanding of behavior in general, as well as any claim that 
there may be principles of behavior that travel across contexts, content, 
and samples of subjects. So we had to adapt. Salancik started 
conducting research with Pfeffer on power in organizations. Calder 
moved into marketing research. And I started a project with Greg 
Oldham, hoping to glean some insights from his extensive training with 
Richard Hackman, an established leader in the field I was earnestly 
trying to join.
At this early point in my career I was very frustrated not only with the 
internal workings of the field (i.e., the publication process), but also its 
finished product. My training in experimental methodology left me 
entirely skeptical of the correlational findings that then dominated 
organizational behavior and I/O psychology. So I tried a frontal attack. I 
wrote a paper with the somewhat grandiose title, “Attribution of the 
‘Causes’ of Performance: A General Alternative Interpretation of Cross-
Sectional Research on Organizations.” I argued that many of the field’s 
most accepted findings could be explained by reverse causation, which I 
tried to demonstrate with a simple group experiment. I showed that 
when subjects were fed false information about their workgroup’s 
performance, they would rate the group’s characteristics (e.g., 
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cohesiveness, conflict) in accordance with its performance. This seemed 
natural enough and in line with developments in the psychology of 
causal inference. Nonetheless, reviewers at two major journals rejected 
the paper because it was based on artificial groups in a laboratory 
experiment. I was naturally dejected, but decided to give the paper 
another try with a newer outlet, then called Organizational Behavior and 
Human Performance. The piece again received uniformly negative 
reviews. Still, Karl Weick, then the journal’s associate editor, encouraged 
me to add a second experiment and to resubmit the paper. Although the 
reviewers thought the revision only made the paper worse, Weick 
accepted the piece over their unanimous objections. To this day, I have 
never observed such a brave editorial decision. It probably saved my 
career, given that I was having grave doubts about whether I would ever 
be allowed to play a useful role in this field.
The reason I go into such detail about these early career experiences is
not that I had a set of encounters that were entirely unique. Others 
suffered a similar fate. My point is simply to emphasize that a certain 
amount of adaptation was needed to survive as a young scholar moving 
into the field of organizational behavior. My prior training did not fit the 
basic orientation or skill set that was dominant in the field at that time. I 
had arrived to the field with reasonable training in social psychology and 
macro-organizational behavior (Northwestern’s organization theory 
program was largely macro at that time), although I knew little of I/O 
psychology or micro-organizational behavior. So, like others who had 
migrated into our field during the 1970s and 1980s, I had to make some 
serious adjustments. In essence, each of us had to figure out what value 
added we could bring to the field, so that we might use our particular 
backgrounds as a resource in reformulating theory and method. 
Unfortunately, I do not believe such a process of adaptation is happening
(at least to the same extent) nowadays. In fact, I would argue that, as 
the number of social psychologists affiliated with departments of 
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organizational behavior and management has grown over the past 
decade, fewer of these new entrants are seeking to change the field. 
Instead, most seek to advance their careers as social psychologists 
rather than challenge and change the study of organizational behavior. I 
will elaborate on this somewhat harsh observation, as I believe it is so 
consequential to our field today.
THE INFLUX OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGISTS TO THE FIELD OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
Over the past decade, a number of prominent senior scholars have either
migrated entirely from psychology departments to business schools or 
have chosen to split their time equally between the two fields. At the 
junior level, the influx has been even more pronounced. As a 
consequence, the ranks of micro-organizational behavior faculty at many
of the top US business schools are now filled primarily with social 
psychologists rather than people trained by other organizational 
behavior groups. This is generally the case at Stanford, Chicago, 
Northwestern, Berkeley, Columbia, Duke, Yale, and UCLA, to name a few 
of the leading programs in organizational behavior and management. 
How did this happen?
There have been several catalysts for this sea-change in the 
composition of organizational researchers. One driving force has been 
the disparity in resources between business schools and the disciplinary 
social sciences. While university budgets have continued to be strained, 
with few position openings in the areas of social psychology or I/O 
psychology, business schools have expanded rapidly with positions 
regularly available in the areas of organizational behavior and 
management. Salary differences have also widened between business 
schools and psychology departments, making fields such as 
organizational behavior, management, and marketing destinations of 
choice rather than necessity.
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Although differences in job openings and salaries have existed for 
decades, until recently business schools had been quite reluctant to hire 
social psychologists, especially at the junior level. Even though newly 
minted social psychologists generally have had a longer list of 
publications than those receiving doctorates from business schools 
(especially when coming from a prolific lab), there were always fears 
about whether these young psychologists could handle MBA teaching. 
Northwestern’s postdoc program was instrumental in dispelling that fear.
Northwestern was one of the first business schools to popularize the 
teaching of negotiation, and their approach to the subject fit well with 
the talent pool of social psychologists intending to move to the business 
school environment. Northwestern’s approach to negotiation research 
relied heavily on lab experimentation, and its teaching pedagogy 
involved the extensive use of exercises and simulations of business 
negotiations. Teaching negotiation courses was therefore an easy 
transition for young psychologists who had little background in business. 
After spending two years in Northwestern’s postdoc program (or in 
several other programs modeled after it), social psychologists were then 
positioned to dominate the entry-level market for assistant 
professorships in organizational behavior. Their resumes were longer. 
Their teaching experience was now relevant to the business school 
environment. And, given an extra two years for conducting research, 
these postdocs appeared to be much stronger job candidates than newly 
minted graduates from organizational behavior doctoral programs.
A third factor underlying the influx of social psychologists into 
organizational behavior has probably been the evolution of the field 
itself. When I entered the field there was an emphasis on 
interdisciplinary research, where concepts were routinely borrowed from 
psychology, sociology, and economics to explain how people behaved in 
the organizational context. Organizational behavior groups were a place 
where people came together from many disciplinary backgrounds to 
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address some common properties and problems of organizations. 
However, over the past decades the field has bifurcated into distinctly 
micro and macro branches. Whereas doctoral students in organizational 
behavior were expected to take theory courses in both sociology and 
psychology, current students stick primarily to one core discipline. 
Whereas dissertation committees would routinely include micro and 
macro scholars, committees are now more uniformly psychological or 
sociological in their composition. Currently, faculty in micro- and macro-
organizational behavior go to different annual meetings (except for the 
Academy of Management), read vastly different literatures, and use 
methodologies that specifically reflect their core disciplines. In fact, it is 
now rare for an organizational behavior group to seek a generalist in 
organizational research; instead, they search for a candidate in micro- or 
macro-organizational behavior, where the micro-macro split means 
specialization in psychological or sociological research. Young scholars 
who might choose to take a multidisciplinary approach, perhaps using 
multiple methodologies, often face more difficult job prospects than 
those taking a more orthodox, disciplinary approach.
In summary, a confluence of forces have worked to increase the 
number of social psychologists in the field of organizational behavior. 
What may have started with the lure of greater resources (salary and 
positions) provided by business schools only took hold as postdoc 
opportunities provided the mechanism for crossing from psychology to 
business. And, as this migration started to pick up steam, it also made 
increasing sense from a research perspective, as the field of 
organizational behavior became specialized into exclusively micro and 
macro branches. In recent years, these trends have become self-
reinforcing, with those doing the hiring implicitly (and explicitly) 
replicating themselves through the recruitment and selection process.
WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SHIFT?
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The migration of social psychologists to the field of organizational 
behavior could be expected to bring new impetus to our understanding 
of behavior in organizations. Perhaps the ambitions of classic works such 
as The Social Psychology of Organizations (Katz & Kahn 1966) and The 
Social Psychology of Organizing (Weick 1969) might finally be realized 
with this dramatic increase in talent coming into the field. The new wave 
of immigrants, like prior generations of social psychologists, might 
reexamine the constructs and theories that currently prevail in the field 
of organizational behavior and reshape them in more productive ways. 
And, given the changing demographics of the field (moving from minority
to majority status), this transformation might be a smoother task than 
what my colleagues and I faced during the 1970s and 1980s. In other 
words, the new majority could seamlessly reshape what now constitutes 
micro-organizational behavior.
Unfortunately, this is not what is happening in our field today. Although
social psychologists from previous generations had to adapt their 
research to succeed in the business school environment, this is not 
required of the current group of transplants. The current generation 
continues to publish in disciplinary journals such as Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology and Psychological Science rather than adapt their 
wares to outlets such as Administrative Science Quarterly and the 
Academy of Management Journal. Their style of research has also not 
been altered much in the transition. It is still largely aimed at validating 
psychological processes rather than understanding organizational 
phenomena or problems. It is still largely based on laboratory 
experimentation using student samples rather than field observations of 
organizational members, analyses of archival data, or even field 
experiments. It is still largely based on short-term manipulations (e.g., 
“recall the last time…”) rather than ongoing experiences in the 
organizational context. And, the focus of research is still mainly 
concerned with individual perception and behavior rather than the 
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dynamics of behavior as they play out in organizations across multiple 
levels of analysis. In short, the research of social psychologists working 
in business schools is not very different from that of social psychologists 
working within their home discipline. Such limitations in focus and 
method have served to unduly restrict organizational research, at least 
from what it could potentially be. I provide some examples of these 
limitations by briefly examining two topics of research that have been 
most heavily influenced by the influx of social psychologists, that of 
power and decision making.
POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS
One of the areas of real progress over the past 15 years is the social 
psychology of power. We have learned that the experience of power can 
lead to a broad increase in personal agency, including one’s action-
orientation (Galinsky et al. 2003), self-assertion (Anderson & Berdhal 
2002), risk taking (Anderson & Galinsky 2006), and creativity (Galinsky 
et al. 2006). However, an increased focus on one’s own desires and the 
means to accomplish them also seems to come at the expense of the 
needs of others. The experience of power has been found to lead to rude,
selfish, and even unethical behavior (Ward & Keltner 1998G. Ward, D. 
Keltner, unpublished manuscript; Keltner et al. 2003). Not only are those 
with power less inhibited in the expression of their emotions (Keltner et 
al. 2003), but the expression of certain emotions such as anger may 
actually lead others to attribute more power to the actor (Tiedens 2001). 
These are just a few of the findings coming out of this productive stream 
of research (see Anderson & Brion 2014, Anderson & Brown 2010 for 
reviews).
The practical application of research on power to the business world 
often involves the teaching of techniques for gaining power, such as 
seeking and allocating valued resources, participation in decision-making
40
bodies, and the formation of strategic alliances. However, more recently, 
with the influx of social psychologists into business schools, there has 
also been an emphasis on increasing the perception of power. For 
example, MBA students can be empowered through the recall of past 
experiences of influence (Galinsky et al. 2003) and even the 
repositioning of one’s body into a wide posture (Carney et al. 2010), with
the goal of helping those displaying behaviors associated with power to 
move up the hierarchy. Unfortunately, given the many downsides of the 
self-perception of power (e.g., self-centered and even unethical 
behavior), training others to enact power moves could come with some 
serious side effects. As a result, we may need research on ways to 
restrain those with power as well as ways to mitigate the collateral 
damage to others. Some of this may also require the bolstering of the 
power of followers. We already know that increasing a leader’s sense of 
power can inhibit the expression of opinions and ideas by those 
interacting with the high-power person (Locke & Anderson 2015, Tost et 
al. 2013). We may therefore need more research on how to get the 
voices of those without power to be effectively heard. When tasks are 
highly interdependent and based on dispersed knowledge, effective 
mechanisms for sharing that knowledge are needed. But, unfortunately, 
power is often confused with competence, such that those with expertise
but low in power are not heeded. Thus, at a minimum, there should be 
greater emphasis on the antecedents and techniques of upward 
influence, so that those with less power can play a more significant role 
in group and organizational interactions.
A related line of inquiry might focus on how leaders can not only 
possess and exercise power, but at the same time maintain some 
understanding and compassion for others. Some research has already 
found that under certain circumstances power can foster a sense of 
responsibility rather than just entitlement (Tost 201  6  5  ). Somewhat 
ironically, when empowered leaders see others’ contributions as 
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important for their own (and their group’s) achievement, they tend to be 
more responsive and inclusive in their behavior toward others (Tost et al.
2013). Thus, it may be time to revisit alternative forms of organization 
such as flatter and more interdependent forms of hierarchy, where 
groups function in a collaborative rather than hierarchical fashion. We 
may also want to re-examine the selection of organizational leaders. I 
suspect there are personality characteristics that allow some leaders to 
exercise power without the usual bluster and disdain for others. 
However, these same personality characteristics may now serve as a 
handicap in rising to the highest levels of the organization. Thus, we 
should not just study the consequences of decent and wise leadership, 
but how wise and decent people can attain positions of leadership.
As Pfeffer (1981) noted long ago, the exercise of power is the way 
things get done in organizations. Grand strategies are nothing but 
rhetoric if they are not actually implemented into budgets and action 
plans. Corporate visions do not often move beyond the boardroom when 
they are subtly resisted by lower levels in the organization---when people
nod their heads in agreement but drag their feet during implementation. 
Thus, defining power as the capacity to alter another’s behavior may not 
be as useful as thinking of power as the ability to get others on board 
with enthusiasm and zeal (Grant 2012). Logically, this may be where the 
construct of leadership starts to have meaning beyond the simple 
ascription of power or the exercise of specific forms of managerial 
behavior such as structuring work and setting goals.
At this juncture, it may be most useful to link research on the 
psychology of power to more macro research on control structures (see 
Tost 201  6  5   for a start in this effort). Power norms in the organization 
should certainly be part of this endeavor, especially as they relate to the 
exercise of power in interpersonal interactions. It may also be helpful, 
however, to examine the psychological effects of organizational 
structures designed to broaden the influence of employees (e.g., via 
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worker’s councils, board representation, and other forms of participation)
beyond what is currently practiced in most business firms. We might also
reexamine the flexibility of power structures over time, going back to the
question of whether organizations with more fluid power structures are 
more adaptive over time, given that they may be more responsive to 
new demands and opportunities in the environment. Finally, we might 
welcome a return to Tannenbaum’s (1968) classic work suggesting 
power to be an additive rather than relative concept, where perceptions 
of total rather than relative power are associated with greater 
organizational effectiveness.
DECISION MAKING
Arguably, one of the greatest achievements in the social sciences over 
the past few decades has been the development of theory and research 
on judgment and decision making (or JDM; see, e.g., Kahneman et al. 
1982, Kahneman & Tversky 2000). This work not only resulted in a Nobel
Prize for Daniel Kahneman, but with it a belated appreciation of cognitive
shortcomings by the field of economics, which had previously assumed 
that human behavior was the product of fully rational self-interest. 
Although the field of organizational behavior has long valued the concept
of bounded rationality (e.g., Simon 1957, March & Olsen 1976) and 
understood the prevalence of decision errors (e.g., Bazerman 1994), it 
was recently argued that the fields of I/O psychology and organizational 
behavior would be greatly enriched by paying closer attention to JDM 
research (Dalal et al. 2010). I’m not so sure, at least as JDM research is 
currently practiced.
One of the beauties of JDM’s research findings is their simplicity. We 
have learned that people generally fall victim to common biases and 
heuristics, using rather straightforward comparisons to objective facts or 
by drawing clear contrasts with economic rationality. The results of these
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experimental tests have been incorporated into a litany of cognitive 
shortcomings such as overconfidence, anchoring, insensitivity to sample 
size, hindsight bias, sunk cost effects, etc. Despite this impressive list of 
findings, however, some scholars have persuasively noted limits to JDM’s
effects. People may not be so error prone if they are placed in a more 
accountable state, where their outcomes or processes can be observed 
by others and where there are incentives to be careful and accurate 
(e.g., Tetlock 1985, Lerner & Tetlock 1999). Moreover, patterns of causal 
attribution and perception typically found in Western psychological 
research may not always extend to other contexts (e.g., Nisbett 2003). 
Even the very act of choice has been found to be culturally dependent. 
European Americans not only value independent choice to a greater 
extent than Asians, but they are also more likely to perceive their 
environments as containing a greater number of  discrete choices or 
decisions (Markus & Schwartz 2010). Thus, when attempting to extend 
JDM research to organizational settings we need to refrain from 
academic hubris. What may appear to be universal biases and heuristics 
may instead be tendencies that are a product of culture and context.
Because JDM research is generally laboratory based, it is often an 
exercise in parsimony. The goal is to isolate particular psychological 
forces, holding extraneous influences constant so that main effects (and 
interactions) can be demonstrated clearly and convincingly. In 
organizational settings, however, there may be a multiplicity of forces 
creating background noise that obscures all but the strongest JDM 
effects. The context may also facilitate multiple decision errors that 
contradict each other. For example, investment decisions could be 
influenced by some forces that promote conservatism (e.g., a status quo 
bias) at the same time that other forces stimulate risk seeking (e.g., 
prospect theory’s predictions for gambling in a loss situation). Another 
complication is that well-known (or easily observed) biases may give rise 
to efforts to compensate for their effects. For example, consider the 
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commercial real estate industry where it is commonly understood that 
developers (those who propose construction projects) generally 
exaggerate the positive outcomes of their proposals. Experienced 
investors are thus quite wary of the estimates provided by developers, 
discounting their optimistic promises. The situation is similar within 
corporate settings, where managers routinely promote projects that 
enhance their own power and influence. Because data are expected to 
be tilted in a self-serving manner, executives in charge of allocating 
resources are thus likely to deflate managers’ overconfident judgments 
and excessively optimistic projections. Adding to this complexity, 
sponsors of competing projects may also work hard to find and publicize 
flaws in the estimates of their rivals, helping to squash their rosy 
predictions.
Thus, a key question for researchers on topics such as overconfidence 
is whether biases will survive in an organizational arena that naturally 
includes a variety of checks and balances. Just because a decision bias 
has been repeatedly validated in the lab does not mean that it will be 
manifested in the same way within an organizational environment. 
Perhaps some biases are so ingrained that they will survive 
countervailing and confounding forces, so that their effects can be found 
in archival data over long periods of time (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick 
1997, Staw & Hoang 1995). Some biases may even be heightened by a 
multiplicity of facilitating forces, as Janis’ (1972) found in his early 
investigations of groupthink. Still others may not survive at all in a 
naturalistic situation. Therefore, as researchers, we must ask why some 
decision biases develop and grow in the wild, whereas other errors are 
more constrained in the organizational environment (see Zsambok & 
Klein 2014 for some empirical leads).
APPRECIATING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
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My comments about recent research on power and decision making can 
be broadly interpreted as a call for greater contextualism. As McGuire 
(1983) noted more than 30 years ago, experimentation involves the 
subtle art of set design, where central issues or forces are made salient 
to subjects whereas others are relegated to the background. In 
organizational experimentation, greater contextualism may therefore 
mean less of an emphasis on artificial tasks (such as spinning dials and 
estimating the weight of others) and more attention to the simulation of 
work experiences (e.g., through in-basket exercises and more realistic 
scenarios). However, contextualism is more than just trying to make 
experiments somewhat realistic. It also involves greater appreciation for 
the phenomenon under study, and this may be a demanding chore for 
the current crop of social psychologists working in business schools.
To get an accurate fix on a given phenomenon one has to understand 
the environment in which it takes place. Often such an understanding 
results from personal experience in the field. For example, Arlie 
Hochschild had worked as a flight attendant before becoming a 
sociologist and turning her attention to emotional labor. John VanMaanen
had spent summers as a young Disneyland employee before later 
examining the Magic Kingdom from a research perspective. Rod Kramer 
had a short career as a screen writer before becoming an organizational 
behavior professor conducting research on Hollywood pitches. Even my 
own research on escalation of commitment benefited from some 
important vicarious experience. As a young man I watched my father 
attempt to turn around a failing business. He was one of the early 
entrepreneurs in discount retailing, growing his company from a single 
store to a thriving regional chain. Once large national corporations 
entered the industry, however, most of the independent operators were 
forced to drop out. They either sold their businesses or gradually 
withdrew their personal resources from their firms. Instead, my father 
moved more and more of his own funds into the business as it declined---
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until it finally failed and he had depleted most of his assets. His was a 
classic case of escalation of commitment.
Obviously, not all researchers have the benefit of personal experience 
to elucidate their object of study. They do, however, have the 
opportunity to conduct interviews with the actors they intend to study 
and the possibility of observing the environment they seek to simulate. 
They also can capitalize on alternative methods in their pursuit of a 
phenomenon. For example, in my early research on escalation I relied on
some simple scenario studies to demonstrate that individuals have a 
tendency to throw good money after bad (Staw 1976). This preliminary 
finding was replicated, extended, and moderated through further 
laboratory research (see Brockner 1992, Sleesman et al. 2012 for 
reviews). I was pleased, on the one hand, that my early work was being 
followed up. On the other hand, I was uncomfortable with the near total 
reliance on laboratory research to test the phenomenon. I kept 
wondering why no one had yet conducted a case study to see how 
escalation takes place in a real organization, and why no one had yet 
conducted archival research to demonstrate escalation’s effects across 
multiple settings over time.
I was not a qualitative researcher, but I let Jerry Ross convince me that 
we should conduct an in-depth case study on the decision to hold the 
World’s Fair, Expo 86. At the time, Jerry was a professor at Simon Frasier 
University located near Vancouver, British Columbia, the prospective site
for the fair. He had access to a wealth of information and was 
enthusiastic about sharing it with me. Still, I was a bit hesitant. Although 
Jerry and I had conducted many lab studies on escalation, neither of us 
had much experience in analyzing qualitative and historical data. Luckily 
I listened to Jerry, since we learned a great deal about escalation through
this case study. The events leading to Expo 86 illuminated the 
importance of social and organizational processes for understanding how
escalation operates. We learned that commitment to a course of action 
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might be influenced by a leader’s identity being tied to a particular 
project, by departmental or subunit power being based on the survival of
a venture, and by a project or product becoming so institutionalized that 
withdrawal becomes almost unthinkable (Ross & Staw 1986). In addition,
from this case study we began to appreciate how multilevel forces can 
often occur sequentially, where individual decision errors give rise to 
social and organizational processes bolstering commitment (Staw 1997). 
Such observations would not have been possible if our research had 
been confined to the laboratory. Only by moving from the lab to the field,
and by moving from controlled experiments to more qualitative case 
studies, was it possible to understand the range and sequencing of 
forces that hold organizations to losing courses of action (see also Ross &
Staw 1993).
Established wisdom on research methodology teaches us that different
methods possess distinctive strengths and weaknesses in terms of 
internal and external validity (Campbell & Stanley 1966). Moreover, a 
quick survey of the social sciences would lead us to conclude that 
particular methods tend to be disproportionately associated with certain 
academic disciplines (e.g., lab experimentation with psychology, archival
research with economics and sociology, qualitative methods with 
anthropology and sociology). Therefore, given that all research is flawed 
in some fundamental way (McGrath et al. 1982), the only route to 
achieving a better understanding of a phenomenon is through the use of 
multiple methodologies. Unfortunately, as Chatman & Flynn (2005) have 
noted, few topics in organizational research have gone through such a 
“full cycle” of research. More typically, topics are explored almost 
exclusively by a particular methodology, and this is especially the case 
when most of the researchers addressing the topic have come from a 
common disciplinary background. Thus, my plea to young scholars who 
have recently entered our field is to try some alternative methodologies, 
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even if they are only a means to enrich the methods on which one 
normally depends.
PHENOMENON-DRIVEN RESEARCH
When I argue for the need to contextualize research, I am not necessarily
saying that we need to avoid laboratory research. We do need to make 
lab research more reflective of the contexts in which organizational 
phenomena operate. However, beyond these typical pleas for greater 
external validity, I am also arguing for research that is designed to 
understand organizational phenomena rather than more general 
psychological theory. The purpose of most psychological research is to 
test fundamental theory and/or extend that theory to new contexts. For 
example, some excellent research on perspective taking recently 
extended that psychological process to intergroup relations, 
negotiations, and ethical behavior (see Ku et al. 2015 for a review). 
Although this program of research has been fruitful, it is primarily the 
extension of social psychological theory to the organizational context 
rather than an effort to generate new theory about that context. 
Alternatively, if we were to construct new theory explaining some aspect 
of organizational life (e.g., intergroup conflict), perspective taking would 
be included only if we deemed it to be central to that issue.
In my view, constructing theory in organizational behavior should 
primarily be about understanding organizational problems and/or 
phenomena. Problem-driven research has long been the central mission 
of I/O psychology, and this has been a source of strength as well as 
weakness. It is a strength in that attention is focused on outcome 
variables that are considered important by one or more constituencies. 
However, it can also be a weakness when the field focuses on a very 
limited set of variables and from a very limited perspective. Early in my 
career, conversations with colleagues would often include jokes about 
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publishing, noting that a study would only be publishable if it addressed 
one of four dependent variables: work performance, absenteeism, 
turnover, or job satisfaction. Even when I wrote an annual review chapter
on the field (Staw 1984), I argued for a reformulation of research on 
these same four variables rather than a wholesale scuttling of the list. I 
did try to stretch the list of outcomes to include creativity and 
innovation, but that was the limit of my bravery.
By proposing that social psychologists become more grounded in their 
organizational research, I am not advocating an unfamiliar role. 
Remember that much of the research on attitude change originated from
efforts to sell bonds during World War II as well as concerns over the 
impact of propaganda. Similarly, the examination of the bystander effect 
(Darley & Latane 1968) started with questions about the murder of Kitty 
Genovese, when numerous witnesses observed a brutal crime but did not
call the police for help. Therefore, as important organizational events 
occur in the world (e.g., a corporation’s admission of financial fraud, a 
severe industrial accident, or a major product breakthrough), they should
spark our interest in building theory that might explain these outcomes. 
Even everyday contradictions and anomalies should wet our appetite for 
research. In a sense, my study of dispositional sources of job attitudes 
(Staw & Ross 1985, Staw et al. 1986) was a product of anomalous 
events. It resulted from the observation of a close relative continuing to 
be disgruntled as her work and life situation were both improving. This 
led me to challenge prevailing theories of job attitudes that had 
emphasized either the objective nature of the work (Hackman & Oldham 
1976) or the role of situational influence (Salancik & Pfeffer 1978), and 
prompted me to test a more dispositional theory of job attitudes.
In advocating contextualism, I also want to make the case that 
psychological research on organizational phenomena can reach upward 
and outward rather than just in an inward direction. That is, we can use 
psychological insights to explain organization-level phenomena, as 
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Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007) have done in constructing measures of 
CEO narcissism to explain corporate acquisitions and erratic financial 
performance. As Bob Sutton and I argued in a piece called “Macro 
Organizational Psychology” (Staw & Sutton 1993), there are at least 
three major ways that psychological forces can influence the behavior of 
organizations: (a) Autonomous agents can represent the organization to 
outside publics; (b) powerful members can influence organizational 
structures, reputations, and performance; and (c) the aggregation of 
individual traits, emotional states, and beliefs can shape organizational 
attributes and behavior.
The examination of upward and outward influence can also be more 
than an inventory of which micro features (such as individual 
characteristics) are associated with macro variables (e.g., group and 
organizational structure). As recently elaborated by Morgeson et al. 
(2015), important events may initially confront individuals and then 
subsequently induce changes in the work group and larger organization. 
An Eevent can also initially hit the organization and theirits impact then 
filter down to the individual member. Regardless of the direction and 
scope of such events, however, the major point of Morgeson et al.’s 
model is that events can be usefully traced through the organizational 
system. By following the impact of particularly important and disruptive 
events, we may begin to understand processes that extend from the 
individual actor to other entities in the organizational system.
At present, most research in micro-organizational behavior is not 
particularly concerned with how individual behavior can influence the 
social context in which people work, let alone the larger scale actions of 
the firm. Instead, most of the energy in current research is devoted 
toward more microscopic explanations of the person’s behavior. It has, 
for example, become standard practice to include tests of mediation in 
most psychological research papers. The idea is to isolate the process 
underlying an empirical finding so as to “prove” that a particular 
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theoretical mechanism explains a given effect. However, often these 
tests of mediation don’t delve much deeper than the older practice of 
conducting a manipulation check, especially when they entail measures 
that are simple acknowledgments of having received the treatment 
rather than an assessment of the underlying process. And, even when 
they are informative, we should keep in mind that mediation analysis 
contributes to the trend toward delving inward rather than searching in 
an outward or upward direction to explain a person’s influence on other 
people and/or entities in the organization.
In recent years, the trend toward inward discovery (or reductionism) 
has been heightened by the use of neurological and other forms of 
physiological measurement (e.g., Akinola 2010). Although past research 
occasionally used blood pressure and heart rate monitoring as an 
indicator of stress, it is now more common for organizational researchers
to include saliva tests for levels of cortisol and brain imaging in studies of
decision making, attraction, and attitudes. Whereas traditional research 
might measure a person’s affect with paper and pencil scales, modern 
neuroimaging provides objective validation by demonstrating activity in 
areas of the brain generally associated with pleasure or pain. However, 
do such measures really provide an advance, and if so, are they worth 
the added difficulty and expense? Old-fashioned measures carry the 
liability that they are generally reactive instruments. Respondents may 
act differently when they know they are being observed, perhaps 
tailoring their answers to the tastes and dictates of the questioner. For 
example, being asked a question about job satisfaction may be 
interpreted (and answered) quite differently depending on whether the 
question comes from someone associated with management (the usual 
case with organizational behavior research), from someone representing 
a union, or from a sympathetic person sitting next to the respondent on 
a commuter train. Physiological measures may make it more difficult for 
the respondent to hide his/her true emotions. However, given that 
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physiological measurement is rarely unobtrusive (at least not with our 
current technology and ethical standards), what we think are objective 
responses may still be colored (perhaps in a complex way) by the 
motives and fears of respondents. And how should we interpret 
significant differences between physiological data and more traditional 
scores? Which do we believe? If I think I am happy, but show 
physiological distress, am I still happier than when I think I am unhappy, 
yet show physiological contentment? Such a philosophical dilemma 
should not only perplex us but serve as an impetus toward greater 
understanding of the meaning of psychological states.
MOVING FROM APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY TO A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Much of my discussion, to this point, could be characterized as a lament 
that our understanding of organizational behavior may have been 
unexpectedly sidetracked by the influx of social psychologists. I have 
made the case that, with their increased numbers and greater legitimacy
within the business school environment, social psychologists have not 
had to make the painful adjustments necessary to really understand 
organizational phenomena. As consequence, many of these scholars 
have continued to pursue basic psychological research, while others 
have sought to extend social psychological theory to the organizational 
context. Much of my own work probably falls into this second category of
research, given that my lab studies of escalation could be interpreted as 
a simple extension of dissonance and self-justification theory to the 
organizational world. Although useful, this applied social psychology falls 
short of the ambitions of a true social psychology of organizations.
Table 1 summarizes some of the key differences between social 
psychology applied to organizations and a more far-reaching social 
psychology of organizations. As noted in the table, most applied social 
psychology uses laboratory or field experimentation as a way of 
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extending existing psychological theory to organizational settings. In 
contrast, a social psychology of organizations seeks to understand the 
phenomena and problems of organizational life, and this goal is pursued 
with multiple methods, multiple levels of analysis, and a search for 
causal influences that may travel in an upward, outward, as well as 
downward direction. With applied social psychology, the context is 
generally seen as a factor that limits the external validity of findings, 
something that must be accounted for in the design of more realistic lab 
settings and through a broader sampling of field sites. With the social 
psychology of organizations, understanding the context is the main focus
of inquiry. It is why new theory must often be built to explain processes 
that go beyond or in a different direction from more basic psychological 
research.
<COMP: PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR FOR WHOM?
So far I have been advocating changes to our style of research that 
might help us better understand organizational behavior. However, I 
would be remiss if I did not also acknowledge the role that various 
constituencies play in our research. As Becker (1967) warned long ago in
his discussion of sociological research, we should regularly ask why and 
especially for whom are we are investigating certain phenomena.
When I first entered our field I imagined that I was joining the holy 
pursuit of knowledge, endeavoring to understand how and why people 
(and collectivities) behaved as they did. Soon I realized that such noble 
goals were not the only reasons for our research. As a business school 
professor I felt pressure to investigate whether certain actions or 
processes could make a difference in the performance of individuals and 
outcomes for the firm. Later I came to appreciate that the vantage point 
of business schools, however narrow it might be, was still somewhat 
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broader than the purview of I/O psychology. Whereas the audience (and 
often the sponsor) of research in organizational behavior has been the 
management of organizations, the audience of I/O psychology research 
can be interpreted as firms’ HR department or various associations of HR
professionals. Thus, while management is concerned with the overall 
well-being of the organization (its performance, efficiency, adaptability), 
the I/O perspective is more focused on specific organizational issues and 
functions such as selection, training, retention, safety, and work 
performance.
Probably the only area of organizational research that does not (at 
least implicitly) take the employer’s point of view is that of behavioral 
ethics. No doubt there is a stream of research on employee theft that is 
primarily concerned with the employer’s cost of “shrinkage” (e.g., 
Greenberg 1990). The main thread of organizational research on ethics, 
however, is what prompts employees (and firms) to lose their moral 
compass, to commit illegal and/or unethical acts (Moore & Gino 2013). In
this regard, it should be noted that many illegal acts may not actually 
begin as self-centered or selfish attempts to cheat. A substantial number 
of ethical violations probably start with an effort to serve others in the 
corporation---as an effort not only to meet personal goals, but also as a 
way to help one’s supervisor and workgroup make their numbers, 
thereby allowing bonuses to be distributed, layoffs to be avoided, and 
the possibility of bankruptcy to be eliminated. Unfortunately, what may 
start as an effort to help one’s colleagues and the larger organization can
morph into wholesale fraud as sales are “borrowed” from upcoming 
quarters, channels stuffed, and earnings engineered through opaque 
financial transactions. Only recently has some attention shifted from the 
reasons individuals succumb to the temptation to cheat to the social and 
organizational processes that can sustain unethical behavior over time 
(see, e.g., Ashforth & Anan 2003, Brief & Smith-Crowe 2016).
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Aside from the study of behavioral ethics, few research topics in 
organizational behavior are explicitly oriented toward the collective 
good. Actions that improve corporate profits may or may not aid the 
general public, depending on how the profits are achieved and whether 
they are achieved at the expense of other competing interests. For 
example, Google is a firm that is celebrated as the creator of many 
innovative products and was founded with the credo “Don’t Be Evil.” 
However, this imperative has not been extended to the payment of 
federal and state taxes. It has not prevented the company from parking 
much of its earnings overseas so as to minimize tax liabilities, even 
though its operations benefit at least indirectly from federal and state 
expenditures (e.g., through the education of its employees). My goal is 
not to single out Google for criticism, given nearly every major 
technology company has a similar tax avoidance strategy, but to point 
out that our field primarily takes corporate well-being as the end-state to
be achieved rather than the perspective of the larger community. To 
date, there has been little or no research on determinants of corporate 
resistance to layoffs, although there was great variance in such actions 
during the last major recession. Similarly, there has been little research 
on what leads corporations to embrace or resist environmental 
regulations, although there are certainly wide differences in the stance of
firms and industries on this issue. Finally, our field rarely takes the 
exclusive perspective of individual workers---especially if their welfare 
comes at the expense of organizational well-being. For example, when 
we address issues such as job satisfaction and workplace stress we make
the implicit assumption that what is good for the employee is also good 
for the employer. We avert our attention from employee-centric topics 
such as how one might get promoted (when being no better than others 
on the job), how not to get fired (when making a minimal contribution or 
working on an unsuccessful project), and how to maximize one’s time 
with family rather than at the corporation (without jeopardizing one’s 
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career). Whimsical answers to these questions can of course be gleaned 
from traditional research (e.g., bias in performance evaluation and 
promotion decisions), but few of us have had the nerve to take such an 
extremely employee-centric perspective.
STUDYING POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE EFFECTS
Although most of our research and teaching has been devoted to 
improving the functioning of organizations, I’m not sure we have always 
taken the most practical route toward this end. Generally we try to 
analyze actions associated with high performance and attempt to instill 
these practices among a wide range of individuals and organizations. 
However, we may have a greater impact if we concentrated on behaviors
and practices to avoid. For example, rather than studying the sources of 
good leadership, we might actually get more out of the analysis of really 
bad bosses, those whose toxic behavior drives others out of the 
organization (Sutton 2010) or leads the firm in a strategically disastrous 
direction (Chatterjee & Hambrick 2007). Similarly, we might examine 
truly dysfunctional incentive schemes, the kind that cause adverse 
reactions and extremely negative side effects (Ordóñez   et al. 2009 ). 
Another fruitful candidate could be the mechanisms that move ethical 
lapses at the individual level to more widespread organizational 
wrongdoing (Darley 1992, Brief & Smith-Crowe 2016). Finally, my 
favorite candidate for study may be catastrophic decision making, where
small decision errors can grow into major organizational blunders 
(Bazerman & Watkins 2004).
By having greater understanding of the origins of adverse 
consequences we may be able to avoid the most extreme instances of 
negative outcomes rather than just moving forward the average level of 
the curve. At the individual level, such a focus might involve isolating the
organization’s worst performers and discovering what has driven them to
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such a negative level. The same could be argued in terms of group and 
organizational performance. Regardless, my advice would not be to 
mimic the dictates of Jack Welch, who advocated the yearly dismissal of 
the organization’s bottom 10% as well as the removal of any product line
that is not among the top two in its industry. Instead, my 
recommendation would be to learn what has led to being on the negative
tail, so that these behavioral paths can be avoided in the future. Such an 
inquiry might be somewhat similar to the postmortem examination of 
medical accidents used by hospitals or the lessons learned by the 
military in studying its losing battles.
Of course, studying adverse consequences is not easy, given that it 
often entails the in-depth analyses of people and units who prefer to 
avoid the exposure of their errors. For instance, I once offered to conduct
research at a large national bank to see how factors used in the loan 
approval process affected subsequent performance of their loans. Even a
small improvement in loan procedures could make a large impact on the 
bank’s profitability. Nonetheless, the executive in charge of corporate 
lending resisted all aspects of this research, saying that it would be too 
much trouble and too costly for the bank. After much prodding, he was 
finally willing to tell me the real reason for his resistance. Essentially he 
said, “Your research is designed to show areas for improvement, but it 
can also be interpreted as an indictment of our loan policies. Since I am 
the author of the current policies, I will not risk any exposure of their 
shortcomings.” Although I tried to convince him that he could also take 
credit for any improvements, he felt the risk was just too great. So I 
thanked him for his honesty and went on my way.
Because few organizations are likely to welcome behavioral 
researchers in a search for errors, abuses, violations, or other 
shortcomings, investigators need to be more creative in their approach 
to the subject. Rather than entering the firm through the front door, it is 
often more feasible to study mistakes and immorality from the outside---
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from interviews in employees’ homes, from anonymous websites, and 
from the confines of churches and country clubs. In one of the most 
creative inquiries on illegal corporate behavior, Clinard (1983) 
interviewed former executives who had retired to Arizona and New 
Mexico, where they were much more open about the misdeeds of their 
former employers and even themselves. We need to finally follow 
Clinard’s lead with research in which behavior is either unobtrusively 
observed or reported in a more candid manner.
CONCLUSION
This article recounts some of my early experiences in the field and how 
they shaped my views about conducting research. As I described, my 
entry into organizational research was not seamless. Although I arrived 
with publications in social psychology and believed I could publish 
additional work in that venue, I had to make a series of adjustments to 
succeed in my chosen field of organizational behavior. As with many of 
my colleagues who had moved from psychology to organizational 
behavior, I had to find some value added, be it a new perspective or an 
alternative set of ideas for the field. This was, I believe, a worthwhile 
endeavor---one that enriched us as migrant scholars and one that helped
move the field forward. Unfortunately, as I outline here, this process of 
mutual adjustment has largely ceased. Although an increasing number of
social psychologists are now housed in business schools, they are still 
doing social psychological rather than organizational research. For this to
change I argue that future research needs to become more contextual 
and phenomenon driven. My hope is that, with the upsurge in talent 
entering the field we can find a way to harvest more of its creativity, 
moving from the application of social psychology to a genuine social 
psychology of organizations.
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Table 1 Alternative paths for organizational research
Social 
psychology
applied to 
organizations
Social psychology
of organizations
Goals of the
research
Application of 
social
psychological 
theory
to behavior in 
organizations
Understanding
organizational phenomena,
problems, and issues
Levels of
analysis
Individual and 
group
levels of analysis
Multiple levels of analysis,
including cross-level inquiries
Research
methodology
Lab and field
experimentation
Multiple methods,
including qualitative and
quantitative research, and
use of real-time, observational,
and historical data
Direction of
inquiry
Search for
underlying 
processes
(reductionism)
Search for upward,
outward, and
downward influences
Form of
contextualis
m
Context as a
limitation to
external validity
Context as a primary
focus of investigation stigation
